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DISCOVERY IN CBIMINAL CASES - A SURVEY




It is generally agreed that the dominant policy in criminal pro-
cedure is the ascertainment of truth. The argument that the true facts
are developed only by the prosecutor - and the defendant must not be
allowed to require the prosecutor to disclose before trial the evidence
he expects to offer - is out-of-date and untenable. As entertaining as
they were, the days of a criminal trial as a "sporting event" should now
be numbered.'
Criminal procedure must be designed in fact, as well as in theory,
to present as accurate a portrayal of the alleged crime as possible and
should minimize the opportunities for falsification in that portrayal.
It is clear that the truth can only become available under our system
of law if the defense has an equal opportunity with the prosecution to
develop the facts.' Justice Brennan, after noting that in practice there
has been considerable disclosure by prosecutors, stated the problem
succinctly: "I think we must all agree that the opportunity for dis-
covery on equal terms should either be the right of all accused, or the
right of none."' If this principle be correct, it would seem to follow
that to arrive at the truth at trial, it is necessary for the parties to
disclose fully before trial, consistent with constitutional guarantees
afforded the defendant, the evidence to be submitted. The "spirit of
concealment" has no place in a criminal trial."
* (B.A., 1957, LL.B., 1961, University of Colorado; Assistant Editor, Federal Bar
Journal; Attorney, Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The opinions
expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts.)
1. "Those of us of the Bench and Bar who adhor and deplore procedural change
in any form, and those who yet cling to the idea that the trial of a case is a sporting
game of skill and chance have difficulty in adjusting ourselves to a new concept in thejuridical search for truth, which is justice." Murrah, The Pretrial Conference:
Conceptions and Misconceptions, 12 Wyo. L.J. 226 (1958). See also FRANK, COURTS
ON TRIAL 91 (1949); and Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event orQuest for Truth, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279.
2. The extent to which the prosecutor's professional responsibility requires him
to disclose exculpatory information to the defendant in advance of trial - in order
to insure a fair trial - has always been a matter of conjecture. See Comment, 60
COLUM. L.R. 858, 860-61 (1961).
3. Brennan, supra note 1, at 282.
4. "[T]he common law originally was very strict in confining each party to his
own means of proof, and . . . regarded a trial as a cock fight, wherein he won whose
advocate was the gamest bird with the longest spurs." Ulrich v. McConaughey, 63
Nebr. 10, 20; 88 N.W. 150, 154 (1901). "It considered a law suit a game between
skilled antagonists with the judge serving merely as an umpire to see that the rules
of the game are observed, and the judgment going to the more skillful." Yankwich,
Concealment or Revealment, 3 F.R.D. 209 (1943). See also Louisell, Criminal
Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. Rev. 56, 102 (1961). The
sporting theory of justice is criticized by POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 163
(1930).
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It is apparent why a defendant needs liberal pre-trial disclosure in
a criminal case. He is often without adequate means and represented
only by assigned counsel or a public defender. 5 He may be barred from
any initial fact-gathering efforts by the simple reality of being in
custody. The police are usually the first at the scene of the alleged
crime and therefore come into possession of most of the physical evi-
dence. The government is well-equipped with scientific detection appa-
ratus and trained investigators; the defendant is not so endowed.6
An exploration of the policy considerations against full disclosure,
i.e., that discovery "will lead not to honest fact finding but on the con-
trary to perjury and suppression of evidence," 7 leads this writer to
conclude that whatever relevance that argument once had, it is now
illusory. If experience with the civil discovery rules can be any guide,
then such above-mentioned abuses are not likely to occur. Liberal dis-
covery in civil cases has not encouraged fabrication or destruction of
evidence or created an opportunity for intimidation of witnesses.8
The present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure already provide
for a certain amount of discovery before trial. Rule 16, relating to
inspection of papers and objects in the hands of the government belong-
ing to the defendant or obtained by seizure or process, is the most
5. See generally Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and
the Administration of Criminal Justice, February 25, 1963.
6. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 will achieve a certain balance in this regard
by allowing counsel assigned to the defendant to request the court to authorize in-
vestigative, expert, or other services "necessary to an adequate defense." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(e) (Supp. 1964).
7. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210; 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 907 (1953), noted in 38 MINN. L. Rv. 397 (1954). Chief Justice Vanderbilt's
argument in State v. Tune was made years before in an English case, Rex v. Holland,
100 Eng. Rep. 1248, 1249 (1792). Therein, pretrial inspection of documents was sought
by an official of the East India Company. The official, charged with malfeasance and
corruption, was denied access to the documents on the theory that the granting of such
a request would "subvert the whole system of criminal law." This case is no longer
the law in England, see DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 112
(1958) ; nor is State v. Tune the law in New Jersey, State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133,
145 A.2d 313, 318 (1958). See also Freed, The Rules of Criminal Procedure, An
Appraisal Based On A Year's Experience, 33 A.B.A.J. 1010, 1012 (1947).
8. Many states have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to
discovery. The Rules, 26-37, are discussed in 4 MOORE, FEDERAL. PRACTICE, § 26-37
(2d ed. 1950). The "perjury" argument was prevalent prior to the adoption of the
civil rules. See Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE
L.J. 863 (1933).
The importance of a liberal approach to discovery is pointed up when its chief
benefits are considered. Professor Moore has enumerated them as follows:
"1. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in checking and
preventing perjury.
"2. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and sham
claims and defenses.
"3. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often inexpensive way facts
which otherwise could not have been proved, except with great difficulty and
sometimes not at all.
"4. It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims
and defenses, thereby encouraging settlements out of court.
"5. It expedites the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the courts, and
clears the docket of many cases by settlements and dismissals which otherwise
would have to be tried.
"6. It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays, and narrows and
simplifies the issues to be tried, thereby expediting the trial.
"7. It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases." Moore, supra at
1014-16.
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significant discovery provision. Rule 6(e) allows for disclosure of grand
jury matters by order of court; rule 7(f) provides for a bill of particu-
lars, and rule 17(c) makes subpoena powers available to the defense.
Prior to these rules little discovery was available in the federal
courts.'" The federal system followed the orthodox common law rule
of minimal or no discovery in criminal cases. Although there were
instances of some form of discovery allowance," discovery prior to the
Federal Rules was always in doubt.' While the present rules provide
a good beginning, discovery is far from complete under them. The
courts have been highly restrictive in their interpretation of the rules
and thus, even today, the right to broad discovery in criminal cases
does not exist.' Past surveys of the cases interpreting the current
criminal discovery rules point to the limited availability of discovery
to the defendant.' 4
Discovery in a criminal case is limited in the belief that it would
be a one-sided affair benefiting only the defendant, who, the theory
suggests, is already being given too much protection. Such safeguards
as rights against self-incrimination, unreasonable searches and seizures,
testimony of accomplices, circumstantial evidence, double jeopardy,
entrapment, and rules concerning burden of proof and presumption of
evidence all favor the defendant.' However, the balance in criminal
9. Rule 15, on depositions, is not a discovery measure at all; its sole function
is to enable the defendant to obtain the testimony of a witness who is unable to appear
at a trial or hearing. It may not be used for general discovery purposes. United
States v. Grado, 154 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Mo. 1957). Also to be distinguished from
the Federal Rules devices is an application for a list of prosecution witnesses, which
is not covered by the Rules. References to state law on criminal discovery are not
made in this article. For an excellent summary, see Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in
State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1960).
10. For a good historical review of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, see
Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. REv.
221 (1957). See also 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, § 671 (12th ed. 1955). Orfield
cites as the first case on federal discovery allowance United States v. Burr, 25 Fed.
Cas. 30 (1807), where Chief Justice Marshall (as Circuit Judge) upheld a subpoena
duces tecum issued before indictment and before arraignment. This case involved the
prosecution of Aaron Burr. Burr's attorneys made a request for pretrial inspection
of a letter addressed to the President of the United States and in the possession of
the United States Attorney. The request was granted by the trial judge.
11. United States v. Warren, 53 F. Supp. 435 (D. Conn. 1944), holding that the
defendant was entitled to inspection of the contents of a package alleged to have been
sent through the mails containing a threatening letter; United States v. B. Goedde &
Co., 40 F. Supp. 523, 524 (E.D. Ill. 1941), granting an order to the defendant to inspect
impounded documents belonging to him.
12. United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S.
556 (1932). Note that the sole case cited by the Supreme Court did not provide
for a broad rule against discovery. See Arnstein v. United States, 296 Fed. 946, 950(D.C. Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 595 (1924). In Rosenfeld, the court upheld
the decision of the district court which denied discovery of a written statement of a
government witness.
13. United States v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers' Association, 9
F.R.D. 509 (D.D.C. 1950). Therein, District Judge Holtzoff noted that, "It is well
settled that in a criminal case, unlike a civil action, such a right to broad discovery
does not exist." Id. at 510.
14. See Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 1051-64
(1961) ; Comment, Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 YALE L.J. 626 (1951) ;
Note, Criminal Discovery - The State of the Law, 6 UTAH L. REv. 531 (1959).
15. In denying a defendant's motion to inspect grand jury minutes, District
Judge Learned Hand stated this position rather strongly: "Under our criminal pro-
cedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to
the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from
[VOL. XXV
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trials still lies with the government. 16  Certain procedural practices
work to the benefit of the prosecution and consequent disadvantage to
the defendant, e.g., the current trend to eliminate precise pleading and
relax various requirements, the general present unavailability to the
defendant of a bill of particulars, the deficiencies of the preliminary
hearing as a discovery device, and the availability of the grand jury
to take depositions. And it should always be remembered that the
generating force in a criminal case is the prosecution. It is the prosecu-
tion that gathers the evidence, and there can be no room for doubt that
law enforcement agencies are far more effective in gathering their
evidence than the accused. Further, in a great majority of cases the
prosecution obtains the confession of the accused before he can consult
counsel.' Regardless of the concept of mutuality - that the defense
should give up "something" in return for discovery of the prosecutor's
evidence - criminal prosecution is not designed to see who is the
better combatant.
II.
THE PROPOSED DISCOVERY RULE AMENDMENTS
To liberalize the discovery process now available to the defendant,
the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States has released for consideration of the
bench and bar the second preliminary draft of proposed amendments
to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District
Courts.' These amendments include important changes in the rules
relating to discovery, especially in Rule 16, Discovery and Inspection.
Minor but significant changes are proposed in Rules 6(e), The Grand
Jury - Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure, and 7(f), The Indict-
ment and Information - Bill of Particulars. A new Rule 17.1, Pre-
Trial Procedure, is also suggested. The text of the proposals is set
forth in the Appendix to this article.
The major substantive changes occur in Rule 16. The provision in
present Rule 16 which limits discovery to items "obtained from or
belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or
process" is generally restrictive and appears to be inadequate. The
scope of the rule was stated in United States v. Haug9 : "The history
of the rule indicates that it was intended to provide for only a limited
question or comment on his silence: he cannot be convicted when there is the least
fair doubt in the minds of anyone of the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance
have the whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense,
fairly or foully. I have never been able to see .... " United States v. Garsson, 291
Fed. 646, at 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). See also Yankwich, Concealment or Revealment,
supra note 4, at 209ff.
16. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YAIE L.J. 1149 (1960).
17. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Supreme Court held (5-4)
that the accused's statements made during police interrogation and before he could
have advice of counsel were inadmissible as evidence in the subsequent trial. The
refusal to honor the defendant's request to consult with his attorney constituted a
denial of his right to assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
18. Drafts are available on request from the Advisory Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Supreme Court
Building, Washington, D.C. 20544.
19. 21 F.R.D. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1957).
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discovery. 2 0 This rule has been narrowly construed to include only
those tangible items in existence at the time they were obtained by
the government. 2 '
Basically, the proposed amendment would expand and modify
Rule 16 in order to overcome those court decisions which have limited
its effectiveness. Under the suggested amendments, the defendant will
no longer be required to show that the material is in the possession of
the government; the court will have the power to require the prosecu-
tion to disclose defendant's own statements or confessions; and the
court will also have the power to require the disclosure by the prosecu-
tion of the results of reports of physical examinations, scientific tests,
experiments and comparisons. The discovery or inspection of internal
government documents and statements or reports made by government
witnesses or prospective witnesses other than the defendant to agents of
the government is to be allowed only as authorized by the Jencks Act.22
Proposed Rule 17.1 would permit pre-trial conferences in criminal
cases. Although a similar proposal in 1944 was not adopted by the
Supreme Court when the Criminal Rules were originally promulgated,
many judges have, despite the absence of a rule, held such conferences
in special types of criminal cases such as mail fraud, and have found
such conferences extremely beneficial.
The requirements for obtaining a bill of particulars is liberalized
by the deletion of the words "for cause" from Rule 7(f). This change
is proposed "to encourage a more liberal attitude by the courts toward
bills of particulars without taking away the discretion which courts
must have in dealing with such motions....
A. Statements of the Accused
Whether the defendant is entitled to inspection of his own state-
ments made to police or agents of the government, or confessions, writ-
ten or recorded, in the hands of the prosecution, has always been a matter
of great contention.24 There seems to be no valid reason why the person
who made a statement should not have a copy of that statement.
Since the most significant part of the preparation of a defendant's
case may be an analysis of his confession, it seems elementary that the
discovery of a confession prior to the trial is necessary to enable counsel
for the defense to adequately prepare his case. 25  Yet, the majority
20. Id. at 26.
21. United States v. Rothman, 179 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Pa. 1959) ; United States
v. Malizia, 154 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ; United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367
(D.D.C. 1954).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958).
23. Second Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the United States District Courts 4 (Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, March, 1964).
24. Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 843, 11 A.L.R.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1949),
(defendant not entitled to a copy of his confession). See also United States v. Patrisso,
20 F.R.D. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Cf. United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431, 437 (N.D.
Cal. 1954) (discovery of a confession permitted under the subpoena power of rule
17(c)). See generally Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendants
owzn Statements in the Federal Courts, 57 COLUM. L. Riv. 1113 (1957).
25. A few courts have granted such motions, United States v. Fancher, 195 F.
Supp. 448 (D. Conn. 1961) ; United States v. Singer, 19 F.R.D. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ;
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follow the contrary rule as enunciated in United States v. Murray.26
There, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that state-
ments voluntarily given by the defendants to the Internal Revenue
Service were not discoverable under Rule 16, because those statements
had no "existence" before he made them; therefore, they did not
"belong" to him, and Rule 16 could not be used. A different view was
intimated in Leland v. Oregon,27 where the Supreme Court said that
the lower court's refusal to require the district attorney to make one
of an accused murderer's confessions available to his counsel before
trial was not a denial of due process. However, the Court said, "while
it may be the better practice for the prosecution thus to exhibit a con-
fession, failure to do so in this case in no way denied appellant a fair
trial. The record shows that the confession was produced in court five
days before appellant rested his case. There was ample time both for
counsel and expert witnesses to study the confession. In addition, the
trial judge offered further time for that purpose but it was refused."2
Subsection (a) of proposed Rule 16 recognizes the significance
of such discovery and would extend it to any "written or recorded
statements or confessions made by the defendant, or copies thereof. .. ."
The court "may" allow such discovery, although no standard is estab-
lished in the Advisory Committee's draft. The amendment limits the
discovery of defendant's statements to those "which are known by the
attorney for the government to be within the possession, custody or
control of the government." The burden would be obviously unrea-
sonable if the government attorney had to search all the government
files to find possibly relevant statements. The adoption of this amend-
ment would go far toward alleviating the unjustifiable situation whereby
the defendant is not allowed a copy of his own statement.
B. Lists of Witnesses
There is no right to disclosure of witnesses in criminal cases.
Requests for such lists are made under Rules 7(f), 16, and 17(c).
Such motions are generally denied, because it is believed the defendant
will tamper with witnesses if he is allowed to reach them. Were this
premise correct, then tampering would be most likely in those cases
involving the death penalty - and yet, in this instance, witnesses'
names are available by virtue of a specific federal statute.2" The federal
courts, in line with their general policy against disclosure, have refused
to extend this right to other categories of defendants.3" But does this
seem logical?
United States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed, 246 F.2d 537(2d Cir. 1957).
26. 297 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 828 (1962) ; Note, 47 MINN.
L. Rnv. 693 (1963).
27. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
28. Id. at 801. (Emphasis supplied.)
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3432. This statute does not, however, require lists of witnesses
before grand juries to be disclosed in capital cases.
30. United States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813 (D.N.J. 1957) (non-capital case);
United States v. Brennan, 134 F. Supp. 42 (D. Minn. 1955) (violation of Taft-Hartley
Law). See also United States v. Brandt, 139 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ohio 1955) (con-
spiracy to violate Smith Act).
1965]
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Some courts have made exceptions to this present rigid rule. A
demand for the names of all people with knowledge of facts relevant to
the transactions in the indictment has been granted.3 ' Also, by way of
granting motions for bills of particulars under Rule 7(f), requests have
been granted for the names of people present at the origin of the
scheme, 32 for names of persons to whom defendant sold narcotics,3 3 for
names of alleged co-conspirators, 34 and for the name of a govern-
ment decoy.
35
Motions under Rules 16 and 17(c) for witnesses' names and
addresses are usually denied, the courts reasoning that "defendants are
not entitled to be provided with a list of witnesses except in capital
cases."' 6 The proposed amendments to Rule 16 would not alter court
rulings of this nature. Therefore, a change in the basic statute would
be desirable.
C. Statements of Witnesses
Before the Supreme Court decision in Jencks v. United States,
3 7
discovery of statements of potential witnesses which were in the posses-
sion of the prosecution was not possible.3 8  Such discovery did not
meet the "seizure" requirement of Rule 16, nor the "evidentiary" test
of Rule 17(c) as outlined in Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States.9
Congress thereafter by statute made such discovery partly possible.4"
The value of obtaining inspection of witnesses' statements is evident;
counsel for the defense needs such statements in order to intelligently
impeach the witness on cross-examination.
In a decision of far-reaching importance, the Jencks Court decided
that a defendant was entitled to inspect reports and statements of
government witnesses. Since this case has been discussed in many
exhaustive articles, a brief summary will suffice. 4
The government's principal witnesses in Jencks, Matusow and
Ford, had been paid by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to make
reports to that agency on the party activities in which they participated.
Jencks was convicted, and on appeal the Supreme Court reversed the
conviction on the ground that the trial court refused to direct the
government to produce the prior reports by Matusow and Ford for use
in their cross-examination. The Court condemned the then-current
practice of allowing the trial judge to inspect certain classes of notes
and memoranda in camera to determine their materiality before allow-
31. United States v. Solomon, 26 F.R.D. 397 (S.D. Ill. 1960).
32. United States v. Guterma, 179 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
33. United States v. Vasquez, 25 F.R.D. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
34. United States v. Pignone, 189 F. Supp. 532 (D. Conn. 1960).
35. United States v. Conforti, 200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. den., 345
U.S. 925 (1953).
36. United States v. Haug, supra, 21 F.R.D. 22, at 27 (N.D. Ohio 1957).
37. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
38. United States v. Schulter, 19 F.R.D. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ; United States v.
Brown, 17 F.R.D. 286 (N.D. Il. 1955); United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367
(D.D.C. 1954).
39. 341 U.S. 214 (1951). See the discussion of this case at Notes 59-60, infra, and
accompanying text.
40. 18 U.S.C. 3500 (1957).
41. See, e.g., Note, The Jencks Legislation - Problems in Prospect, 67 YALE L.J.
674 (1958).
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ing defense counsel to inspect. If the trial judge determined that they
were not material, he had discretion to deny the inspection. The
Court stated:
"We hold, further, that the petitioner is entitled to inspect
the reports to decide whether to use them in his defense. Because
only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the effective
use for purpose of discrediting the Government's witness and
thereby furthering the accused's defense, the defense must initially
be entitled to see them to determine what use may be made of them.
Justice requires no less."42
In addition, the Supreme Court said that a preliminary foundation of
inconsistency between the contents of the report and the testimony of
the witnesses was not required to obtain an order for the government
to produce the Federal Bureau of Investigation's report.
Congress reacted to this decision by enlarging the scope of dis-
covery with the Jencks Act.4 3 This statute now prohibits pre-trial dis-
closures of any statement or report in the possession of the United
States which was made by a government witness or prospective govern-
ment witness (other than the defendant) to an agent of the govern-
ment. The Act provides further for the production of some statements,
but only after in camera inspection and the exclusion of non-relevant
portions by the court.4 4 The statements which may be inspected at the
trial are narrowly defined by the Act. 45 A subsequent case, Palermo v.
United States,46 made it clear that since the statute was apparently
intended to be the sole means of obtaining inspection of materials
falling within the discovery prohibition, certain documents such as a
government agent's summary of a witness interview are no longer
eligible for inspection.4 7
Proposed Rule 16(b) would permit the inspection of documents
containing witness statements in the possession of the government, but
subject to the limitations imposed by the procedures of the Jencks Act.
D. Books, Documents, or Tangible Objects
Motions for access to books, documents, or tangible objects, may
be made under present Rules 7(f), 16, and 17(c). Such requests have
generally been denied under Rule 7(f) as constituting disclosure of
evidence not necessarily needed for clarification to prevent surprise.
However, there have been significant exceptions. In United States v.
42. 353 U.S. at 668.
43. Supra, note 40.
44. 18 U.S.C. 3500(e) (1957).
45. "Jencks does not require the government to open its investigative files in a
criminal case and permit their inspection by persons charged with crime to assist them
in the preparation for their defense. Nor does Jencks require the defendants to turn
over to the prosecution their files of investigative material which they have secured
for their own defense." United States v. West, 170 F. Supp. 200, 209 (N.D. Ohio
1959), aff'd, 274 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1960).
46. 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
47. "The Act's major concern is with limiting and regulating defense access to
government papers, and it is designed to deny such access to those statements which do
not satisfy the requirements of [section] (e), or do not relate to the subject matter of
the witness' testimony .. " 360 U.S. at 354.
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Onassis,4s documents on which the government intended to rely as
proof of crime were given to the defense for discovery purposes after
they had moved for them under Rule 7(f).
Present Rule 16, under which a majority of these requests are
made, authorizes the district judge to order the U.S. Attorney to
permit the defendant to inspect and copy books, papers, documents, and
other tangible evidence obtained from or belonging to the defendant or
obtained from others, by seizure or process, subject to materiality and
reasonableness.4 9 Despite the obvious limitation in the Rule - the
items to be inspected had to be obtained by seizure or process - there
is a wide area of granted requests. Birth certificates,50 non-communist
affidavits, 5' income tax returns, 52 stolen television tubes, 53 diaries,54
and company books containing information on allegedly unreported car
sales55 have been considered proper for pre-trial discovery. Subsection
(b) of the proposed Rule 16 eliminates the "seizure or process" test
and permits inspection by the defendant of documents or other tangible
objects in possession or control of the government subject to a showing
that the items sought may be material to the preparation of the defense
and that the request is reasonable.
Rule 16 has also been construed to permit inspection of drugs, but
not of the scientific examinations relevant to them or of other scientific
reports generally.5 6 However, a judge may allow a defendant's own
expert to make such analysis.57 Subsection (a) of the proposed amended
Rule 16 would extend discovery to the reports of physical or mental
examinations and scientific tests or experiments. The court would have
discretion to permit such discovery; no standard is stated which the
defendant must satisfy.
Present Rule 17(c) in general terms allows either party to serve
subpoenas duces tecum. It also provides that material designated in
such a subpoena is to be made available for inspection by the other
party.5 Before 1951, however, it was not clear that the defense could
use a subpoena duces tecum to obtain access to material in the hands
of the government. In Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States,5 9 this
doubt was resolved, the Court holding that the defense was entitled
48. 125 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1954). For an earlier case, see Burtell v. United
States, 277 U.S. 427 (1913) (discovery of obscene letters). However, since the
adoption of Rule 7(f), the Supreme Court has not dealt with the subject of bills of
particulars. There is an offhand reference to this rule in United States v. Debrow,
346 U.S. 374, 378 (1953).
49. United States v. Rothman, 179 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
50. United States v. Black, 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ind. 1946).
51. United States v. Haug, 21 F.R.D. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1957).
52. United States v. Geller, 163 F. Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
53. United States v. Patrisso, 20 F.R.D. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
54. United States v. Schiller, 187 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1951).
55. Ginsberg v. United States, 257 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1958).
56. United States v. Bentvena, 193 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; United States
v. Angelet, 26 F.R.D. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Bandy v. United States, 296 F.2d 882
(8th Cir. 1961).
57. United States v. Taylor, 25 F.R.D. 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
57. A subpoena duces tecum under this rule requires only that a party produce
documents for use and inspection of adversary and does not authorize a party to obtain
any explanation of the documents produced. United States v. Schluter, 19 F.R.D. 415
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
59. 341 U.S. 214 (1951).
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to examine material obtained by the government without the use of
seizure or process. The Court said that Rule 17(c) can be utilized by
the defense for pre-trial inspection of such material unavailable under
Rule 16 if the material sought "is in a good faith effort to obtain
evidence," whether or not such material might have been obtained
under Rule 16.
Judge Weinfeld, in United States v. Iozia,60 states that the defen-
dant must show the following before a motion should be granted
under Rule 17(c) :
"(1) That the documents are evidentiary and relevant;
"(2) That they are not otherwise procurable by the defendant
reasonably in advance of trial by the exercise of due
diligence;
"(3) That the defendant cannot properly prepare for trial with-
out such production and inspection in advance of trial
and the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unrea-
sonably to delay the trial;
"(4) That the application is made in good faith and is not
intended as a general fishing expedition."'"
Inspection of forged documents, 62 contracts and checks and other bank
records referred to in the indictment, 63 company books involving the
charge,64 and installment contracts in fraud cases6"5 has been permitted.
The proposed changes in Rule 16 will make the use of Rule 17(c)
sanctioned in the Bowman Dairy Co. case unnecessary. The proposed
standard, that the desired evidence "may be material to the prepara-
tion of his defense and that the request is reasonable," is probably more
liberal in allowing discovery than the existing law.
E. Pre-Trial Conference
In ordinary criminal cases, pre-trial conferences are probably
neither necessary or desirable. Trial time is generally short, and the
burden, of course, is on the government to establish guilt. 6 However,
in cases involving multiple defendants, complex issues, and a copious
amount of evidence, pre-trial procedures would frequently be useful.6
In such cases, the saving in time and expense would be considerable.
The defendant would then be apprised more clearly of what evidence
he had to meet and could avoid gathering many witnesses who might
prove not only unnecessary but incompetent.6"
60. 13 F.R.D. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
61. Id. at 338.
62. United States v. Scully, 15 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
63. United States v. Hanlin, 29 F.R.D. 481 (W.D. Ohio 1962).
64. United States v. Ward, 120 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
65. United States v. Solomon, 26 F.R.D. 397 (S.D. Ill. 1960).
66. Wright suggests the use of pre-trial conference seems doubtful in the "run-
of-the-mine cases." See Yankwich, Crystallization of Issues by Pre-Trial: A Judge's
View. 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 470 (1958).
67. West, Criminal Pre-Trials - Useful Techniques, 29 F.R.D. 191, 436 (1962).
68. Estes, Pre-Trial Conferences in Criminal Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319, 561 (1959).
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While a court may have the power to order a pre-trial conference
in a criminal case, it cannot compel either the government or the defense
to make disclosure of their cases (as it can in civil cases) ; it can only
promote agreements and stipulations.6 9  In order to complete the
liberalization of discovery in criminal cases and remove the element of
surprise from this litigation, pre-trial procedure, which has proved so
successful in civil cases, should be imported into the criminal court.7"
The Advisory Committee proposes such a rule.
Objectives of criminal pre-trial conferences are the same as in
civil pre-trial conferences. However, the constitutional protections
afforded the defendant are different in criminal cases.7 The defendant
must be present at every phase of a criminal case, and the court cannot
impose sanctions for defendant's refusal to testify or to admit facts,
as can be done in civil cases. 72 Thus, in criminal cases emphasis in the
pre-trial conference often may have to be on procedures for handling
voluminous evidence rather than on the refining and simplification of
issues." However, as suggested earlier, some gathering of unnecessary
evidence and witnesses by the defendant may be avoided. Proposed
Rule 17.1 will clarify the power of the court to require a pre-trial con-
ference "to consider such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious
trial," subject to the constitutional safeguards afforded the defendants.
F. Discovery of Grand Jury Proceedings
Rule 6(e) is not being amended except to add operators of record-
ing devices and transcribing typists to those who may be directed to
disclose. This rule allows for disclosure of matters before the grand
jury preliminary to trial. Despite this, grand jury transcripts of wit-
nesses' testimony have been virtually unavailable prior to trial.
74
Once the grand jury has the case, secrecy surrounds its deliberations,
and there are strong policy reasons supporting this non-disclosure
of its minutes.
71
69. Kaufman, Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319, 551 (1959) ; Fee,
Pre-Trials in Criminal Cases, 4 F.R.D. 338 (1946).
70. See generally NIMS, PRE-TRIAL (1950) ; Murrah, Pre-Trial Procedure -
A Statement of Its Essentials, 14 F.R.D. 417, 420 (1954).
71. Picard, Special Problems in Criminal Cases and Patent Suits, 21 F.R.D.
462 (1957).
72. Fgo. R. Civ. P. 36.
73. West, Criminal Pre-Trials - Useful Techniques, note 67 supra; Handbook
of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 399-403,
468-70 (1960).
74. United States v. Potts, 57 F. Supp. 204 (M.D. Pa. 1944) (petition to procure
names of witnesses who appeared before grand jury, denied) ; United States v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1942) (motion to inspect minutes of the
grand jury denied).
75. This issue is discussed in United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628 (3d Cir.
1954) and Travis v. United States, 269 F.2d 928, 945 (10th Cir. 1959), where it was
stated that, "[I]nstances when the need for disclosure of grand jury proceedings out-
weighs countervailing policy maintaining the secrecy of such proceedings must be
shown with particularity . . . [and] the burden is on the defense to show that a
'particularized need' exists for the minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy ... "
See also United States v. Schneiderman, 104 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Calif. 1952). See
generally Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343 (1959).
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Non-disclosure of the minutes before the trial prevents the accused
from tampering with the witnesses against him; prevents publication of
derogatory information presented to the grand jury against an accused
who has not been indicted; encourages complainants and witnesses to
come before the grand jury and speak fully without fear that their
testimony will be made public (thereby subjecting them to possible
repercussions); and encourages the grand jurors to engage in unin-
hibited investigation and deliberation by barring, before trial, disclosures
of their votes and comments.7 6
There are instances, nevertheless, where the courts have made
grand jury minutes available to the defense. The minutes have been
made available in refreshing recollection of government witnesses at
trial,17 in impeaching witnesses at trial,7 and in allowing the defendant
to prepare his defense in a case where he is accused of committing
perjury before the grand jury.79 The government has recognized the
fairness of permitting the defense access to the grand jury testimony
of government witnesses, even though it considered that it was not
bound to do so." Should the government use grand jury minutes at
trial, the defense is ordinarily entitled to inspect the relevant testimony
in those minutes."1 The decision to release grand jury minutes results
from weighing the maintenance of secrecy against the defendant's need
for such information to adequately prepare his defense. When the
latter is necessary, discovery of the relevant portions of the minutes
should be allowed. 2
Certainly, most defense counsel requests for the production of.
grand jury minutes are denied under Rule 6(e). Ready granting of
such requests would dangerously impair our system of grand jury
procedure, since it would open the way for an exploratory expedition
into the government's evidence, as well as encourage dilatory tactics.
Yet, the court should carefully screen such requests in line with the
trend toward allowing liberal discovery for the defendant.8 3 Under
proposed Rule 16(a), however, the recorded testimony of a defendant
before a grand jury will be made available for discovery purposes. The
same policy which favors pre-trial disclosures of his written confessions
and statements to the police also supports disclosure of his statements
in this instance.
76. See Goldstein, supra note 16, at 1184-85.
77. Burton v. United States, 175 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1949) ; United States v.
Alper, 156 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Colter, 60 F.2d 689 (2d
Cir. 1932).
78. United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Rem-
ington, 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951).
79. United States v. Grunewald, 162 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
80. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
81. United States v. Brown, 17 F.R.D. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1955) ; Fryer v. United
States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 885 (1953). Yet, where
an inconsistency between a government witness' grand jury and trial testimony
allegedly occurs, the usual procedure calls for an in camera reading by the judge
to determine whether inconsistency exists, United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661,
665 (2d Cir. 1959), noted in 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 961 (1960).
82. "[Alfter the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper
where the ends of justice require it." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, at 234 (1940).





Liberal discovery techniques, together with the use of pre-trial
conferences properly administered, will further the aim of criminal
litigation to arrive at the truth. For too long, the emphasis has been
on the "sporting theory" of justice, a theory that stresses, unfortunately,
that the lawsuit is a game with the judge as the umpire awarding the
prize to the more skillful. This principle is outmoded; it has no place
in a criminal trial, and it is directly contrary to our concept of justice. No
one should contest the fact that beneficial results are achieved by elimi-
nating surprise and confining the trial to the issues, legal and factual.
Circuit Judge Kaufman, in speaking of the trial lawyer, re-
cently said:
"The trial lawyer presents one version or interpretation of
the facts, the one most favorable to his client, and his opposing
advocate does the same. Perhaps some place between the two
versions is what actually happened. The system of adversary pro-
ceedings is based on the premise that the best presentation of both
versions of the facts will result in a close enough approximation
of truth so as to be classifiable as justice. '8 4
For the defense to offer the best presentation of the facts, it must
be allowed a decent opportunity to prepare in advance of trial by
obtaining, through discovery, the facts of the alleged crime. It is no
answer to say that the defendant must remember what he said or did.
Although legal history does not support a broad claim for discovery
in a criminal case, the virtue of our adversary system in criminal trials
lies precisely in the opportunity for a full and fair presentation of
the facts.
84. Kaufman, The Trial Lawyer: The Legal Profession's Greatest Asset, 50
A.B.A.J. 25, 26 (1964).
[VOL. XXV
1965] DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES
APPENDIX
(The printed portions in brackets [ ] indicate deletions, italics are additions.)
RuLE 6. THE GRAND JURY.
(e) SECRECY OP PROCEEDINGS AND DISCLOSURE. Disclosure of matters occurring
before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be
made to the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter, [or] stenographer, operator of a recording
device, or any typist who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring
before the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in con-
nection with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of
the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of
secrecy may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this rule. The
court may direct that an indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody
or has given bail, and in that event the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person
shall disclose the finding of the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and
execution of a warrant or summons.
RULE 7. THE INDICTMENT AND THE INFORMATION.
(f) BILL OF PARTICULARS. The court [for cause] may direct the filing of a bill of
particulars. A motion for a bill of particulars may be made [only] before arraignment
or within ten days after arraignment or at such [other] later time [before or after
arraignment as may be prescribed by rule or orders] as the court may permit. A bill
of particulars may be amended at any time subject to such conditions as justice requires.
RULE 16. DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION.
[Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or informa-
tion, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects,
obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by
process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of
his defense and that the request is reasonable. The order shall specify the time, place
and manner of making the inspection and of taking the copies or photographs and may
prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.]
(a) DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS; REPORTS op EXAMINATIONS AND TESTS; DEFEN-
DANT'S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY. Upon motion of a defendant the court may order
the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photo-
graph any relevant (1) written or recorded statements or confessions made by the
defendant, or copies thereof, which are known by the attorney for the government to be
within the possession, custody or control of the government, (2) results or reports of
physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments -made in con-
nection with the particular case, or copies thereof, which are known by the attorney
for the government to be within the possession, custody or control of the government,
and (3) recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury.
(b) OTHER BOOKS, PAPERS, DOCUMENTS OR TANGIBLE OBJECTS. Upon motion of a
defendant the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant
to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents or tangible objects, or
copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the
government, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation
of his defense and that the request is reasonable. This subdivision does not authorize
the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government docu-
ments made by government agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution
of the case, or of statements made by government witnesses or prospective government
witnesses (other than the defendant) to agents of the government except as provided
in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
(c) DISCOVERY BY THE GOVERNMENT. If the court grants relief sought by the defen-
dant under this rule, it may condition its order by requiring that the defendant permit
the government to inspect, copy or photograph statements, scientific or medical reports,
books, papers, documents or tangible objects, which the defendant intends to produce
at the trial and which are within his possession, custody or control.
(d) TIME, PLACE AND MANNER or DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION. An order of the
court granting relief under this rule shall specify the time, place and manner of making
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the discovery and inspection permitted and may prescribe such terms and conditions
as are just.
(e) PROTECTIVE ORDERS. Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order
that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted or deferred, or make such other
order as is appropriate. Upon motion by the government the court may permit the gov-
ernment to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement
to be inspected by the court in camera. If the court enters an order granting relieffollowing a showing in camera, the entire text of the government's statement shall be
sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate
court in the event of an appeal by the defendant.(f) Tim OF MOTIONs. A motion under this rule may be made only within 10 days
after arraignment or at such reasonable later time as the court may permit. The
motion shall include all relief sought under this rule. A subsequent motion may be made
only upon a showing of cause why such motion would be in the interest of justice.
(g) CONTINUING DUTY To DISCLOSE; FAILURE TO COMPLY. If, subsequent to com-
pliance with an order issued pursuant to this rule, and prior to or during trial, a party
discovers additional material previously requested which is subject to discovery or
inspection under the rule, he shall promptly notify the other party or his attorney or
the court of the existence of the additional material. If at any time during the course
of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to
comply with this rule or with an order issued pursuant to this rule, the court may
order such party to permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously dis-
closed, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the
material not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under
the circumstances.
RULE 17.1. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE.
At any time after the filing of the indictment or information the court upon motion
of any party or upon its own motion may order counsel for all parties to appear before
it for one or more conferences to consider such matters as will promote a fair and
expeditious trial. At the conclusion of a conference the court shall prepare and file
a memorandum of the matters agreed upon. This rule shall not be invoked in the
case of a defendant who is not represented by counsel.
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